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__________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant William Hayden was convicted of receiving a 
firearm while under a felony "information," 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) 
(1988).  The issue on appeal is the meaning of "willfully" in the 
statute's penalty provision, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (1988 & 
Supp. V 1993).  We will reverse and remand. 
  I.  
 In January 1993, Pennsylvania authorities charged 
Hayden with receiving stolen property and with the unauthorized 
use of an automobile.  Hayden received a copy of the criminal 
information, and he signed a form acknowledging receipt that was 
captioned, in capital letters, "RECEIPT OF COPY OF INFORMATION." 
Below the caption were the words, "I hereby certify that I have 
received a copy of the information filed by the District Attorney 
in the above-captioned action," and the accompanying document 
states that "[t]he District Attorney of Allegheny County by this 
information charges" Hayden with receiving stolen property and 
unauthorized use of automobiles and other vehicles.   
 A month after receiving the information, Hayden went to 
a firearms dealer and inquired about purchasing a pistol.  The 
dealer told Hayden that there was a waiting period and that the 
Allegheny County Sheriff's Office and Pennsylvania State Police 
would be notified.  Hayden then asked about purchasing a rifle. 
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In response, the dealer told him he must give proper 
identification, be eighteen years of age, and fill out a Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Form 4473, which was subject to 
ATF inspection.   
 Hayden purchased an AK-47, a semiautomatic rifle with a 
magazine capacity of one hundred rounds.  He also filled out a 
Form 4473 which defined the meaning of the words "indictment" and 
"information" and inquired:  
Are you under indictment or information* 
in any court for a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year?  
* A formal accusation of a crime made by a 
prosecuting attorney, as distinguished from 
an indictment presented by a grand jury.  
 
Hayden answered "no" to this question, even though Form 4473  
 
twice warned that it was unlawful to answer any of the  
 
questions falsely, stating that "[a]n untruthful answer may 
subject you to criminal prosecution."  Just above Hayden's 
signature, the form provided the following certification: 
I understand that a person who answers "Yes" 
to any of the above questions is prohibited 
from purchasing and/or possessing a firearm, 
except as otherwise provided by Federal Law. 
I also understand that the making of any 
false oral or written statement or the 
exhibiting of any false or misrepresented 
identification with respect to this 
transaction is a crime punishable as a 
felony. 
 The ATF ran a criminal history check on Hayden and 
found the information pending in Allegheny County.  Hayden was 
indicted and charged with one count of violating 18 U.S.C.  
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§ 922(n), receiving a firearm while under an indictment or 
information.  At a non-jury trial, Hayden attempted to prove that 
his low intelligence and reading ability prevented him from 
understanding the document sent to him was an "information" and 
that, in purchasing a gun, he did not know he was violating the 
law.  The district court prevented such testimony from Hayden and 
his experts, ruling that the government need not prove he knew he 
was violating the law.  Hayden was convicted and sentenced to 
eight months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a 
$50 special assessment.   
II. 
 Hayden was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), which 
provides as follows: 
 It shall be unlawful for any person who 
is under indictment for a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to 
ship or transport in interstate or foreign 
commerce any firearm or ammunition or receive 
any firearm or ammunition which has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
Section 922(n) has a corresponding penalty provision, found in 18 
U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D), which provides:   
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, subsection (b), (c), or (f) of 
this section, or in the section 929, whoever  
-- 
 
 (D) willfully violates any other 
provision of this chapter, shall be fined not 
more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than 
five years, or both.  (emphasis added). 
 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§3231 (1988).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
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(1988). Because § 924(a)(1)(D)'s willfulness language involves 
statutory interpretation, our standard of review is plenary.  
United States v. Meraz, 998 F.2d 182, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).  We 
review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 
1992).  
III. 
 This case requires us to determine the meaning of the 
term "willfully" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D).  The government 
contends that the term requires merely a purpose to commit the 
prohibited act.  But Hayden alleges "willfully" also requires 
that the government prove he intended to violate the law.  We 
believe that either interpretation is plausible.  Cf. Rachael 
Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The Meaning of "Willful" and 
the Demands of Due Process, 28 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 397, 397 
(1995) (citing Model Penal Code) ("[T]wo interpretations of 
'willful' have developed.  The first interpretation requires 
merely a purpose or willingness to commit the act.  The second 
requires, in addition, an intent to violate the law itself."). As 
the Supreme Court has noted, "'Willful' . . . is a 'word of many 
meanings,' and 'its construction [is] often . . . influenced by 
its context.'"  Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 655, 659 
(1994) (citation omitted).       
A. 
 In 1968, Congress barred persons convicted of or 
indicted for serious crimes from receiving firearms as part of a 
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comprehensive gun control package0 "enacted in response to the 
precipitous rise in political assassinations, riots, and other 
violent crimes involving firearms, that occurred in this country 
in the 1960's."  Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980). 
The offense appeared to contain no scienter requirement,0 and 
courts interpreted it as either requiring no specific intent0 or 
no scienter at all.0   
 Congress recognized later that without a mens rea 
requirement, the law could inflict severe penalties upon persons 
who unintentionally violated firearms offenses.  So it passed the 
Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 
Stat. 449 (1986), which overhauled the system of firearms 
offenses.  The Act "added a set of mens rea requirements by 
amending section 924(a)(1) to punish certain violations only if 
they are committed 'willfully' and others only if they are 
committed 'knowingly.'"  United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 
                     
0Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-351, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 197, 225, 231 (1968), as amended by the 
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1970)).  
0See United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 
1988) ("many of the firearms provisions were, on their face, 
strict liability offenses" prior to their amendment in 1986).   
0See, e.g., United States v. Weiler, 458 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 
1972)  ("[W]e construe Section 922(g)(1) as a Congressional 
determination . . . that the transportation of firearms in 
interstate commerce by persons previously convicted of, or 
charged with, serious crime presents a serious hazard to the 
public welfare without regard to whether the one doing the 
transporting knows of the Gun Control Act.").   
0See, e.g., United States v. Quiroz, 449 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 
1971) (holding that defendants need not know their weapons were 
"firearms," within the meaning of the statute, because  
"§ 922(g), does not contain a scienter element").   
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996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988).  These new penalty provisions, which 
affected a range of firearms offenses contained in § 922, 
provide: 
 § 924.  Penalties  
 (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in 
this subsection, subsection (b), (c), or (f) 
of this section, or in section 929, whoever-- 
 
(A) knowingly makes any false 
statement or representation with 
respect to the information required 
by this chapter to be kept in the 
records of a person licensed under 
this chapter or in applying for any 
license or exemption or relief from 
disability under the provisions of 
this chapter; 
 
(B) knowingly violates subsection 
(a)(4), (a)(6), (f), (k), or (q) of 
section 922; 
 
(C) knowingly imports or brings 
into the United States or any 
possession thereof any firearm or 
ammunition in violation of section 
922(l); or 
 
(D) willfully violates any other 
provision of this chapter, 
 
shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). The 
"catch-all" provision, § 924(a)(1)(D), is applicable to the 
offense for which Hayden was convicted, § 922(n), but it is not 
9 
apparent from the face of the statute what the phrase, "willfully 
violates," is intended to mean.0 
 It took seven years from the time the Firearm Owners' 
Protection Act ("FOPA") was introduced in 1979 to its enactment 
in 1986.  See David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners' Protection 
Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 Cumb. L. Rev. 585, 
585 (1987).  Despite contradictory signals from lawmakers, id. at 
645-53, the most consistent interpretation of § 924(a)(1)(D) is 
                     
0A discussion between Judge Learned Hand and Herbert Wechsler, 
the Reporter for the Model Penal Code, illustrates the difficulty 
in interpreting "willfully" in criminal statutes: 
 
 JUDGE HAND: Do you use . . . [wilfully] 
throughout?  How often do you use it?  It's a 
very dreadful word. 
 
 MR. WECHSLER: We will never use it in 
the Code, but we are superimposing this on 
offenses outside the Code.  It was for that 
purpose that I thought that this was useful. 
I would never use it. 
 
 JUDGE HAND: Maybe it is useful.  It's an 
awful word!  It is one of the most 
troublesome words in a statute that I know. 
If I were to have the index purged, "wilful" 
would lead all the rest in spite of its being 
at the end of the alphabet. 
 
 MR. WECHSLER: I agree with you Judge 
Hand, and I promise you unequivocally that 
the word will never be used in the definition 
of any offense in the Code.  But because it 
is such a dreadful word and so common in the 
regulatory statutes, it seemed to me useful 
to superimpose some norm of meaning on it. . 
. .  
 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.02, at 249 n.47 (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (quoting ALI Proceeding 160 
(1955)). 
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that Congress intended "willfully" to mean that a defendant must 
know his conduct is illegal.  As one author explained:   
Early versions of FOPA required a willful 
state of mind for any prosecutions.  That 
this was understood to require knowledge of 
illegality is apparent from the report on S. 
1030.  The division between "willful" for 
some offenses and "knowing" for others 
originated in the Treasury-NRA negotiations, 
and was specifically premised upon an 
understanding that proof of willfulness 
required proof that the defendant knew of the 
illegality of his conduct. . . .  In light of 
these extensive considerations, it is 
impossible to avoid the conclusion that 
Congress was fully aware that its use of 
"willfully" in FOPA would require proof that 
the defendant actually knew of the illegality 
of his acts.  
 
Id. at 650-52 (footnotes omitted); cf. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 
1002.  In fact, a House report criticized the bill for its 
requirement of willfulness for some offenses, but noted that 
"[p]roponents of the willfulness standard argue that the offenses 
for which the standard would apply are mere regulatory offenses, 
for which a conscious and specific intent to violate the law 
should be required."  H.R. Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1337. 
 Perhaps more persuasive than the legislative history is 
the statutory context in which the "willfully" language appears. 
As we have explained, the penalty provision of § 924(a)(1) 
requires defendants to "knowingly" act for offenses covered by 
the first three subparts thereto, § 924(a)(1)(A)-(C), but 
mandates they "willfully" violate the offenses covered by the 
final subpart, § 924(a)(1)(D).  The Court of Appeals for the 
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Seventh Circuit noted the significance of this distinction: 
"Congress' use of the term 'willfully' in subsection (D) 
indicates that it intended a scienter standard there that is 
distinct from the 'knowingly' requirement of the previous three 
subsections."  United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 314 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
 In defining "knowingly," courts have almost uniformly 
rejected arguments that the term requires the defendant know his 
conduct was unlawful; rather, they have interpreted "knowingly" 
merely to require that the defendant know he was engaging in the 
prohibited conduct.  Id. at 314-15; United States v. Hern, 926 
F.2d 764, 767 n.5 (8th Cir. 1991); Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1001-
03; United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 80-82 (5th Cir. 1988); 
cf. United States v. Langley, No. 93-5219, 1995 WL 476634 (4th 
Cir. Aug. 14, 1995) (en banc).  In light of the legislative 
history, it is difficult to understand what more the "willfully" 
language could require, if not knowledge of the law.  See, e.g., 
Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 315 ("In our view, the only reasonable 
distinction between section 924(a)(1)'s 'knowingly' and 
'willfully' standards is that the latter requires knowledge of 
the law."); Hern, 926 F.2d at 767 & n.6 (noting the defendant 
"assumes, and the government does not dispute, that 'willful' 
means an intentional violation of a known legal duty" and stating 
"[w]e believe the legislative history is consistent with this 
definition of willful").0  Therefore, because of the legislative 
                     
0Although we recognize the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in United States v. 
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history and the context in which "willfully" and "knowingly" were 
added simultaneously to different provisions of the same 
statutory subsection, we hold that "willfully" in § 924(a)(1)(D) 
means the defendant must have acted with knowledge that his 
conduct was unlawful.  
B. 
 Hayden contends that our interpretation of "willfully" 
here is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf v. 
United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).  In Ratzlaf, the Supreme 
Court reiterated "the venerable principle that ignorance of the 
law generally is no defense to a criminal charge."  Id. at 663; 
see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) ("The 
general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no 
defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American 
legal system.").  Nevertheless, Ratzlaf held that in particular 
contexts, such as the case then before the Court, "Congress may 
decree otherwise."  114 S. Ct. at 663. 
 We already have determined the definition of 
"willfully" in § 924(a)(1)(D) requires that a defendant know his 
conduct is unlawful, see supra part III.A, just as the Ratzlaf 
Court decided with regard to the statutes it construed. 
                                                                  
Collins, 957 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 944 
(1992), we concur with the discussion of Collins in United States 
v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 315 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In reaching the 
opposite conclusion in Collins, the Second Circuit neither 
discussed Sherbondy and Hern, nor attempted to differentiate 
between FOPA's 'knowingly' and 'willfully' standards.  Indeed, 
Collins failed even to note that FOPA applies a 'knowingly' 
standard to some violations and a 'willfully' standard to 
others.").   
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Nevertheless, we believe the Ratzlaf analysis is neither useful 
nor applicable here. 
 As in this case, Ratzlaf involved two statutory 
provisions, the first criminalizing the conduct and the second 
designating the penalty.  Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(n), 
924(a)(1)(D) (at issue here) with 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3), 
5322(a) (at issue in Ratzlaf).  In Ratzlaf, the offense barred 
transactions structured "for the purpose" of evading certain 
federal financial reporting requirements.  31 U.S.C. §5324(a)(3).  
Thus, the statute required that a defendant know he was evading 
reporting requirements and intend to do so.  Section 5324's 
corresponding penalty provision, § 5322(a), set out punishments 
for persons "willfully violating" the statute.  The government, 
however, contended that the "willfully violating" language of the 
penalty provision meant nothing, that "the 5324 offense is just 
what it would be if you never had 5322."  114 S. Ct. at 659 n.7. 
 The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that 
courts should hesitate to treat statutory terms as "surplusage." 
Id. at 659; see also United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 
1261 (3d Cir.) (in banc) ("The [Ratzlaf] Court found that failure 
to read knowledge of illegality into a violation prosecuted under 
§ 5322 would -- in light of § 5324's purposefulness requirement -
- treat '§ 5322(a)'s willfulness' requirement essentially as 
surplusage."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995).  The Ratzlaf 
Court also found it significant that courts of appeals 
consistently had interpreted the § 5322 "willfulness" 
requirement, as applied to other offenses in the same subchapter, 
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to require both "'knowledge of the reporting requirement' and a 
'specific intent to commit the crime,' i.e., 'a purpose to 
disobey the law.'"  114 S. Ct. at 659 (citations omitted). 
Finally, the Court rejected the claim that "structuring is so 
obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' 
requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's 
knowledge of the illegality of structuring."  Id. at 662. 
 The considerations the Supreme Court found persuasive 
in Ratzlaf, however, are not present in this case.  There is no 
attempt here to treat the language of the penalty statute as mere 
"surplusage."  As we have noted, the criminal statute and 
corresponding penalty provision in Ratzlaf both contained mens 
rea requirements, the first requiring the conduct be done "for 
the purpose of" evading federal reporting requirements and the 
second penalizing those "willfully violating" the first.  See 31 
U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3), 5322(a).  In this case, the criminal 
statute contains no mens rea requirement; only the corresponding 
penalty provision does.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(n), 924(a)(1)(D). 
In fact, Congress enacted the "willfully" language in the penalty 
provision in 1986 to ensure that the firearms statutes contained 
a mens rea element and would not be interpreted as strict 
liability offenses.  See supra part III.A.  Therefore, even if we 
had construed the "willfully" language here merely to require 
that defendants know they are committing the prohibited act, we 
would not be treating the term as "surplusage."0 
                     
0Besides its primary concern with treating statutory language as 
"surplusage," the Ratzlaf Court noted two other factors it found 
15 
 In support of his position that Ratzlaf controls this 
case, Hayden cites our decision in United States v. Curran, 20 
F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994), which applied the Ratzlaf willfulness 
standard to violations of a federal false statements statute.  In 
Curran, the defendant was convicted of causing election campaign 
treasurers to submit false reports to the Federal Election 
Commission in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 1001.  Section 
1001 prohibits making false statements to a federal agency and 
requires that "the government must prove that prohibited conduct 
was performed 'knowingly and willfully.'"  Id. at 567.  Section 
                                                                  
persuasive.  First, it found significant the fact that the courts 
of appeals consistently had interpreted the "willfully" language 
in the applicable penalty statute to require a purpose to disobey 
the law.  114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (1994).  In this case, however, the 
courts of appeals are divided in their interpretation of § 924, 
the penalty provision at issue.  See supra note 6. 
 
 Second, the Court rejected the claim that currency 
"structuring is so obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad' that the 
'willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective of the 
defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring."  114 S. 
Ct. at 662.  This case involves firearms, which the Supreme Court 
has determined are not generally such dangerous devices as to 
"put gun owners on notice that they must determine at their 
hazard" whether ownership of certain weapons would constitute a 
crime.  Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1798, 1800 
(1994).  This reasoning may not apply here, however, because 
those indicted for or convicted of felonies are routinely subject 
to restrictions not applicable to the general population; thus, 
they may be held to be on notice of the need to determine whether 
they are barred from certain ordinarily lawful conduct -- such as 
gun ownership.  Cf. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64 
(1980) (noting that firearms control legislation "prohibits 
categories of presumptively dangerous persons from transporting 
or receiving firearms" and that "the fact of mere indictment is a 
disabling circumstance" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), the statutory 
predecessor to § 922(n)).  Because the other factors persuasive 
to the Supreme Court in Ratzlaf do not exist here, we need not 
decide the applicability of this final factor. 
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2(b) provides that a person who "willfully causes" another person 
to commit a criminal act is liable as a principal.  Because the 
Curran defendant did not make the false statements himself, but 
caused campaign treasurers to do so, the government proceeded 
under "section 2(b) in tandem with section 1001."  Id.  Thus, 
Curran involved an interplay between two statutes, both 
containing a willfulness requirement, just as in Ratzlaf.  As we 
have noted, this interplay does not exist between the statutes 
involved in this case.0 
 We emphasize that Ratzlaf did not alter "the venerable 
principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a 
criminal charge."  Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663.  In fact, Ratzlaf 
"emphasized that its decision was particular to the plain meaning 
of the statute then before it."  Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1262 
                     
0In Curran, we also noted that both it and Ratzlaf involved a 
"defendant's knowledge of a third party's duty to disclose 
information to a government agency."  20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 
1994).  In both cases, without the duty to disclose information 
to the government, there would have been no offense.  For 
example, in Ratzlaf, the statute prohibited persons from acting 
"for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements" of 
structuring laws.  114 S. Ct. at 658.  Likewise, in Curran, 18 
U.S.C. § 1001 prohibited persons from making false statements to 
a federal agency or department, and 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) barred 
persons from "willfully" causing others to commit a criminal act. 
The liability in Curran resulted from the defendant causing 
election campaign treasurers to submit false reports to the 
Federal Election Commission.  20 F.3d at 562.  Therefore, if 
there had been no duty to disclose information in Curran and 
Ratzlaf, then the defendants could not have committed those 
offenses.  In this case, however, Hayden was not charged with 
making a false statement on Form 4473 or causing another person 
to do so.  He merely was charged with illegal receipt of a 
firearm.  Although his false statement on Form 4473 may be 
relevant to prove whether he knew his conduct was illegal, it 
does not constitute an element or even directly involve the 
offense of which he was convicted.  
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(citing Ratzlaf).  Therefore, for the reasons we have expressed, 
we believe the Ratzlaf analysis is inapplicable here.0 
IV. 
 Although we believe that "willfully" in § 924(a)(1)(D) 
means a defendant must have acted with knowledge that his conduct 
was unlawful, the question remains what quantum of proof suffices 
for a conviction.  In this case, as we have noted, the ATF Form 
4473 provided a certification of the purchaser's knowledge: 
I understand that a person who answers "Yes" 
to any of the above questions is prohibited 
from purchasing and/or possessing a firearm, 
except as otherwise provided by Federal law. 
I also understand that the making of any 
false oral or written statement or the 
exhibiting of any false or misrepresented 
identification with respect to this 
transaction is a crime punishable as a 
felony.        
Hayden's signature appears on the form immediately below these 
words.  Absent a disability, such as mental incapacity or 
illiteracy, this certification should be sufficient to prove 
knowledge of the law under §§ 922(n) and 924(a)(1)(D).0 
                     
0We recognize that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
relied on Ratzlaf in holding that the "willfully" language of § 
924(a)(1)(D) required a defendant know his conduct was unlawful.  
United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1994).  
But Obiechie is not inconsistent with the result we have reached 
here, because it merely followed Ratzlaf's command to interpret 
willfulness "by considering the context of the term's use within 
the overall structure of the statute," id. at 314, an analysis we 
undertook in section III.A. 
0Of course, a defendant's knowledge could be proven other than by 
certification.  The back of Form 4473 provides instruction for 
cases when a "buyer is unable to read and/or write," and warns 
that "[t]he transferor (seller) of a firearm is responsible for 
determining the lawfulness of the transaction . . . ."  This 
frequently results in firearms owners reading aloud the questions 
on Form 4473 to buyers unable to read.  See infra part IV.B.  
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A. 
 Hayden contends his low intelligence and reading 
ability constituted such a disability, preventing him from 
understanding he was under indictment or information.  Hence, he 
claims he did not know his conduct in purchasing the weapon was 
unlawful.  But we have long recognized that defendants may not 
avoid the knowledge requirement of criminal statutes merely by 
ignoring the high probability they may be breaking the law.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 
1985) (holding knowledge requirement satisfied if "defendant 
himself was subjectively aware of the high probability of the 
fact in question").0  
 This result comports with the rationale underlying the 
requirement that a defendant know he has been indicted.  The 
requirement that the possessor know his status is necessary 
                     
0Cf. United States v. Hester, 880 F.2d 799, 803 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1989) (citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969)) 
("[T]he [Supreme] Court has indicated general acceptance of the 
proposition that awareness of 'a high probability' that a fact 
exists may properly be equated with 'knowledge' in the 
interpretation of criminal statutes."); United States v. Jewell, 
532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). 
 
 In Hester, the court held that knowledge meant actual 
knowledge or "deliberate disregard for its truth or falsity with 
a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth."  800 F.2d. at 
802-03.  We believe that this standard of "deliberate disregard 
for [] truth or falsity with a conscious purpose to avoid 
learning the truth" requires a defendant's subjective awareness 
of the fact in question, in this case, that he is breaking the 
law or that it is "high[ly] probab[le]" he is violating it.  This 
standard does not permit a conviction when a defendant is merely 
negligent or reckless in failing to realize the unlawfulness of 
his actions.  See United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365-66 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
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because of the "special circumstances that may surround one under 
indictment, i.e., he may not be aware of the fact that he has 
been indicted because of failure to serve him on a secret 
indictment."  United States v. Renner, 496 F.2d 922, 926 (6th 
Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Ballentine, 4 F.3d 504, 506 
(7th Cir. 1993) ("Because there is a possibility that an 
indictment will remain sealed, a knowledge requirement would 
appear to be necessary to address the circumstance of a 
defendant's receiving a firearm while subject to an undisclosed 
sealed indictment.  Without such a requirement, there could be 
unintended strict liability."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1222 
(1994).  Therefore, if a defendant knows he has been indicted or 
deliberately avoids ascertaining his status, and thereafter 
purchases a firearm, he will have satisfied the knowledge 
requirement of § 922(n).0 
                     
0Section 922(n) applies to "any person who is under indictment 
for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year."  At oral argument, defendant's counsel asserted the 
government also must prove Hayden knew the crime for which he was 
under information carried a possible jail term of more than one 
year.  We disagree.  In Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 
(1994), the Supreme Court interpreted 26 U.S.C. §5861(d), which 
makes it unlawful for anyone "to receive or possess a firearm 
which is not registered to him."  The Court noted that United 
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), already had determined that 
"§ 5861(d) does not require proof of knowledge that a firearm is 
unregistered."  114 S. Ct. at 1799. Staples concluded that "our 
determination that a defendant need not know that his weapon is 
unregistered suggests no conclusion concerning whether § 5861(d) 
requires the defendant to know of the features that make his 
weapon a statutory 'firearm'; different elements of the same 
offense can require different mental states."  Id.; see also 
Freed, 401 U.S. at 610, 613-14 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[M]ens 
rea is not a unitary concept, but may vary as to each element of 
a crime . . . .  To determine the mental element required for 
conviction, each material element of the offense must be examined 
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B. 
 In this case, the district court prevented Hayden from 
presenting evidence of his knowledge of the information.  Hayden 
contends the precluded testimony as to his low intelligence and 
reading levels would have established that he genuinely believed 
he was not under an information or at least would have raised a 
reasonable doubt in the jury's mind. 
 Evidence of low intelligence and reading ability is 
generally relevant in determining knowledge and is usually a jury 
question.  In similar cases, some factfinders have not been 
convinced by such evidence or have chosen to believe contrary 
evidence offered by the government.  In United States v. 
Fauntleroy, 488 F.2d 79, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1973), the defendant 
asserted an illiteracy defense when accused of knowingly making a 
false statement to a firearm dealer on a Form 4473.  In 
Fauntleroy, however, the dealer read the form to the defendant. 
The court, in a non-jury trial, believed the defendant understood 
the form's questions and determined he knowingly made a false 
                                                                  
and the determination made what level of intent Congress intended 
the Government to prove . . . .").  In this case, we believe the 
length of possible imprisonment is a separate element of the § 
922(n) offense, one for which the defendant need have no mens 
rea.  Cf. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) (holding 
that, in offense of making false statement within jurisdiction of 
agency of United States, the federal agency element is a 
jurisdictional requirement only and conviction does not require 
the defendant knew of that element at the time of the offense); 
United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that §922(g), which bars convicted felons from receiving 
firearms transported through interstate commerce, does not 
require proof that a defendant had knowledge the weapon had an 
interstate nexus).   
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statement.  See also United States v. Petitjean, 883 F.2d 1341, 
1347 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]here was conflicting testimony as to 
whether Petitjean was sufficiently literate to have read the ATF 
Form 4473. . . .  [I]n finding Petitjean guilty, the jury 
evidently rejected Petitjean's illiteracy defense."); United 
States v. Heath, 536 F.2d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding 
conviction of illiterate defendant who made an "X" mark on a Form 
4473 because "the jury must have credited the sales clerk's 
testimony that he asked defendant the required questions and that 
defendant responded falsely"); United States v. Brown, 458 F.2d 
375, 376 (6th Cir. 1972) (upholding false statement conviction in 
case with dispute over whether gun shop owner had read Form 4473 
to illiterate defendant because "determination of credibility was 
within the province of the jury"). 
 We believe that Hayden's knowledge of whether he was 
under an indictment or information was central to his defense and 
indispensable to the factfinder in assessing whether he willfully 
violated § 922(n).  Because the district court prevented Hayden 
from offering such evidence regarding his low intelligence and 
reading ability, we conclude the district court erred.0   
V. 
 In sum, the government must prove Hayden knew or 
deliberately disregarded the fact that he was under an 
                     
0Any use of expert testimony on remand must, of course, comply 
with Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) (barring expert from 
offering "an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did 
or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an 
element of the crime charged").  
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information and that his purchase of a firearm was unlawful. 
Because the excluded evidence had a direct bearing on willfulness 
and was improperly excluded, we will reverse and remand. 
 
